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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Soon after his re-election in December 2012, Mr. Shinzo Abe, Japan’s Prime Minister, 
announced a sweeping change in the direction of economic policy. His new policy has since 
been called ‘Abenomics.’ Among actions taken was the Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s 2011 asset 
purchase program, expanded in April 2013 (coined as Quantitative and Qualitative Easing; 
QQE) which led the Yen to depreciate sharply. In October 2014, the BOJ announced another 
round of the asset purchase program (called QQE2), precipitating further Yen depreciation. 
Since August 2011, the Japanese Yen has depreciated by a cumulative 36 percent against the 
dollar and about 25 percent in nominal effective terms.   
Since the QQE2 announcement, market expectations have clearly shifted to prospects of a 
persistently weak Yen. This shift also reflected some later developments (e.g. further 
softening of commodity prices) that appear to weigh on the BOJ’s commitment to achieving 
its two percent inflation target. What would be the consequences of these prospects being 
realized—not just for Japan, but also for countries like Korea, where the appreciation of the 
Won against the Yen could erode exporters’ competitiveness due to a high export similarity 
in the global market with Japanese goods in the key exporting sectors (Deutsche Bank 
Market Research 2013)? 1   
Over the past two decades, Japan has experienced several episodes of large currency 
movements, with the current episode distinctive in terms of size and persistence. Yet Japan’s 
real export volumes have remained largely flat. In previous episodes of Yen’s depreciation, 
export volumes generally showed a boost within about three years from the beginning of the 
cycle. Why is this not happening this time? One possible answer may be that Japanese firms 
have held off passing exchange rate gains through to consumers—in a manner known as 
pricing-to-market (PTM) 2 —and instead replenished profits. Likewise, Korean export 
volumes have been relatively resilient despite the Won appreciating against the Yen by 
67 percent since August 2011.3 This might also reflect Korean exporters’ limited price pass-
through and their use of profits as a cushion. 
With all of this in mind, we explore how exchange rate changes have affected price pass-
through (or equivalently, margin adjustment) as well as export volumes in the near term and 
1 We limit our analysis on the spillover effects from the Yen’s depreciation given Korea’s exceptionally high 
export similarity with Japan, although the recent depreciation of Euro has also attracted extensive discussion 
within Korea. 
2 Motivated by examples like stickiness in the price of luxury European cars in the U.S. market, despite dollar’s 
large appreciation, Krugman (1987)  introduced the concept of pricing-to-market to the trade literature. 
Krugman attributes PTM behavior to both supply and demand dynamics (e.g., capacity or supply chain 
constraints, reputational relationships with clients). Another important reason can be product differentiation (or 
lack of it), which would have an effect on demand elasticity.  
3 While the Won has also strengthened, the latest Won-Yen episode seems to be primarily driven by the Yen’s 
weakening (see Appendix 8). For linkage between the Yen’s depreciation and Korea’s exports see Box 1. 
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over time.4 We address this question by using a set of exports, domestic prices, and volume 
data for Japan (1989 to 2013) and Korea (2001 to 2014)’s selected sectors.  
In what follows, we first take stock of the impact of the Yen’s weakening so far on export 
prices, export volumes, profits, and market shares (section II). We then show that the limited 
price pass-through and high correlation between profit margin and exchange rate movements 
are in line with exporters’ historical PTM behavior, where they are slow to change prices in 
the short-run but do so over time as exchange rate shocks become locked in (section III). 
Then we show that if the weak Yen persists, it would strengthen Japan’s price 
competitiveness over time, although by how much would differ across sectors, likely 
reflecting different degrees of product differentiation (section III). We also find that while the 
direct effect on export demand will be rather limited, a weak Yen would boost Japanese 
exporters’ profits lastingly, which could reinvigorate the ability, particularly of Japan’s 
flagship exporting firms, to compete and grow in the global market over time. Some of the 
negative effects on Korea’s price competitiveness can be mitigated by Korea’s value chain 
integration with Japan, although evidence suggests that this might play only a minor role 
(section IV). These finding have competitiveness implications for Korea (section V). 
  
                                                                 
4 A number of recent studies have examined the lackluster response of Japan’s export volume from angles that 
are related to but differentiated from ours. For example, Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta (2015) and IMF 
(April 2015b) find that trade income elasticity has declined due to structural factors, such as the maturation of 
global value chain. Previous studies on Japanese exporting firms’ pricing behaviors include Athukorala and 
Menon (1994), Gagnon and Knetter (1995), Loopesko and Johnson (1988), Marston (1990), Ohno (1991) and 
Tange (1997). 
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Box 1. The Link between Yen and Korean Price Competitiveness 
 
The Won-Yen cross rate can affect Korean exports’ price competitiveness through two 
channels: (i) its impact on Korea’s real effective exchange rate (REER),in proportion to 
Japan’s trade weight in its basket, and export prices and (ii) its correlations with Japan’s 
export prices (which would affect Korea’s price competitiveness relative to Japan in the third 
country markets). Section III of the paper examines both channels.  
The impact of the Yen’s depreciation to Korean exporters is not limited to the reduced 
competitiveness in the global market. Yen depreciation could have a positive boost to Korean 
exports when Japanese and Korean products are complementary, as in the case of the linkages 
through the global value chain. The potential significance of such counter-balancing forces is 
explored in Section IV. 
 
However, beyond the short-term, the weak Yen could affect Korea’s export competitiveness 
not only by shifting relative prices, but also by changing relative profit prospects of the 
exporters of the two countries, which will feed into non-price decisions such as investment in 
R&D, where to locate production, and product branding. 
 
Yen’s Depreciation and Korean exports’ Competitiveness: What’s the Link? 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
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II.   HOW HAVE FIRMS RESPONDED SO FAR? 
The pass-through of the weaker Yen and stronger Won to export prices (in contract currency 
terms) has been timid so far, as has been the export volume response. The effect has been 
largely felt in the profit margins of Korean and Japanese exporters. 
 
Figure 1. Exchange Rates of the Won and the Yen 
 
 
A.   Price Pass-through and Volume Response 
While Table 1 shows that both Korean and Japanese exporters have decreased export prices 
since September 2011—cuts by Japan’s exporters have been somewhat higher than Korea’s 
in key sectors where product similarity is high (metal, electronics, and transportation 
equipment)—these cuts are fairly modest given the size of the movement in exchange rates, 
particularly the Yen. Moreover, they happened against a backdrop of declining prices of oil 
and electronic products, which suggests that the pure effects of the exchange rate movements 
may be quite limited.  
 
Table 1. Changes in Exchange Rate and Export Prices (In percent) 
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KRWJPY Overall Metal Electronics Transportation
Korea -2.1 -0.5 -10.2 -12.7
Japan -3.2 -0.5 -24.9 -15.6
Export Volume
-40.1
Percentage change in the Won-Yen Exchange Rate and the Export Volume of Korea and Japan from 
September 2011 to February 2015.
Export volumes have also been slow to respond (see Table 2). Japan’s real export volumes 
continued to decline until late 2012, and then stayed mainly stagnant. Korea’s real exports 
have largely traced a trend similar to the one before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  
Table 2. Changes in Exchange Rate and Export Volume (In percent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.   Profit Margin and Stock Price 
With the limited volume and price response, 
exchange rate movements have been mostly 
reflected in exporters’ profits margins. 
Japanese exporters appear to have used the 
exchange rate gains to decompress their 
profits that had been squeezed after the GFC, 
while Korean companies appear to have used 
their existing profit and cash buffers to 
absorb exchange rate losses.  
 
One striking example is the behavior of 
profit ratios of car makers. For selected Korean and Japanese car makers, profit margin 
developments in recent years paint quite contrasting pictures—Hyundai Motors showing a 
decline in operating margins, while Toyota and Honda experiencing a sharp pick-up since 
2013 (Figure 2). Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3, the quarterly operating margins of 
Hyundai Motors showed a correlation of 0.8 with the Won’s exchange rate against dollar 
(KRWUSD) since the first quarter of 2012. During this time, Hyundai Motors’ operating 
margin (three quarter centered average) decreased by 19 percent, while that of Toyota 
increased by 63 percent. Toyota’s operating margins have shown a correlation of 0.7 with the 
Yen’s exchange rate against dollar (JPYUSD). 
 
The correlation between exchange rates and forward looking profitability is demonstrated, 
too, by the close co-movement between Nikkei 225 index and JPYUSD (correlation is -0.98 
from November 1, 2011 to April 22, 2015) (see Figure 4).5 The correlation between KOSPI 
and KRWUSD has been far less clear, likely reflecting Korea-specific factors such as the 
influence of emerging market-focused global fund flows.  
 
                                                                 
5 Liquidity resulting from QQE may also be a contributing factor to Japan’s recent stock market performance. 
Figure 2. Consolidated Operating Margin Trend
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Figure 3. Exchange Rates and Profits 
 
 
 
C.   What Happened to Market Shares? 
The timid response of export volumes is an intriguing puzzle. A naturally related question 
would then be what has happened to the market shares. In this subsection, we do a market 
share analysis, adopting a decomposition technique proposed by Ree and Choi (2014). Our 
objective is to see, since August 2011, if Korea’s post-GFC market share gains have 
unwound, and if so whether that has benefited Japan. 
Figure 4. Exchange Rates and Stock Prices 
10 
As a first check, we examine the headline figures (see Figure 5). Korea’s global market share 
increased from 2.6 percent in 2008 to 3.1 percent in 2010.  Since 2011, however, it has 
remained flat. In contrast, Japan’s global market share slid from 4.9 percent in 2008 to 
3.7 percent in 2014, with the weak Yen providing little cushion. Key findings are as follows:  
Figure 5. World Market Share (In percent of total world exports) 
 The post-GFC boost to Korea’s market share gains have stalled since 2011. Gains
continue in three leading export destinations6—China, ASEAN, and the U.S.—but they
are being offset by slippages elsewhere (Figure 6).
 This does not appear to have benefited Japan. Japan endured sharp losses in China and
ASEAN where Korea continued to gain.  And it also lost its market shares elsewhere
where Korea lost them too. This indicates that there is little correlation between market
share movements for Korea and Japan.
 The only place where the impact of the weak Yen stood out was the Japanese market
itself, where since 2011 Korean exporters’ post-GFC gains have fully reversed.
Surprisingly, however, Japan’s share in the Korean market fell rapidly during this period
despite the weak Yen, possibly reflecting sluggish manufacturing investment in Korea
(which tends to have high import contents from Japan).
 With regard to individual products, Korea has continued to expand its market share in
electronics, offsetting flat or declining shares in other leading export items, while Japan’s
market share declined across a broad range of products.
6 During the period from 2008 to 2014, 86 percent of Korea’s total market share gain was made in China and 
ASEAN markets. 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
France Japan  
Korea, Republic of Netherlands
Source: IMF Direction of Trade (DOT) Database. 
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Figure 6. Global Market Share Change Drivers 
III. HOW DO FIRMS ADJUST TO EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS?
In this section we explore exporters’ profit margin adjustment (or equivalently price pass-
through) and export volume response to exchange rate shocks. Our aim is to shed light on 
why Japan’s export volumes have responded timidly so far to the weak Yen, and how it 
could affect competitiveness of Korea’s exporters.7    
A.   Are Profit Margins Absorbing the Exchange Rate Movements? 
We first ask if the timid response of export volumes so far can be explained by exporters’ 
PTM behaviors. If exporters behave as price takers, gains or losses caused by changes in 
exchange rates will be absorbed primarily by margins, rather than passed through to prices.  
How strongly exporters do PTM (or the strength of PTM) thus would determine how 
exchange rates influence export volumes over time.  
Specifically, we estimate the historical PTM behavior using a regression model that connects 
profit margins with exchange rates and other relevant variables. As is common in the existing 
studies, we use what we refer to as ‘relative profit margins’ as our dependent variable. 
Relative profit margins are profit margins on export prices in excess of those on domestic 
prices, and their proxy can readily be obtained from macroeconomic data.  
While doing so, we also explore how PTM behaviors vary across industries and over time. 
Intuitively, those who export homogenous products (e.g., corn) are more likely to behave as 
price takers—thus having stronger tendency for PTM—than those who offer differentiated 
products (e.g., designer purses). Also, one would expect that the strength of PTM would 
diminish over time if an exchange rate shock (or shocks accumulated over a period) begins to 
lock in.8 
7 See footnote 3 for the linkage between the weak Yen and Korea’s price competitiveness. 
8 To gauge how exporters respond to exchange rate shocks through profit margin adjustment, we use a model 
developed by Marston (1990), which assumes that manufacturers produce all goods locally but sell them in both 
domestic and export markets applying differentiated prices. We use dynamic OLS (DOLS) to obtain long-run 
elasticity of relative profit margin to changes in REER and error correction models (ECMs) to estimate both the 
short term elasticity and transition dynamics (see Appendix 9 for technical details). 
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Our key findings are as follows: 
First, the long-run effects of exchange rate shocks on relative profit margins are smaller than 
the short-run effect, but more than zero (Figures 7 and 8). In case of Japanese manufacturers, 
a 10 percent depreciation of the Yen in real terms, all else equal, increases the relative profit 
margin by 3–5 percent in the long run. Korean manufacturers’ relative margins show higher 
long-run elasticity to exchange rate movements—thus stronger tendency to PTM.  
Second, the initial (positive) gaps between short-term and long-term elasticity of the relative 
profit margins in response to exchange rate shocks—what we refer to as “overshooting”—
tend to be larger for the Korean manufacturers (Figure 7 and 8). There are significant 
variations in PTM transition dynamics across industries, indicating some correlation between 
PTM and product differentiation.  
 In case of electronics and metal, initial overshooting dynamics are quite evident for both
Korean and Japanese exporters (Figure 7). Especially, in electronics, Korean exporters
seem to be able to unwind the initial overshooting more than their Japanese counterparts,
hence, over time, being able to pass through more to prices. This is consistent with recent
achievements made by Korea’s leading manufacturers (e.g., Samsung and LG) in product
differentiation and branding—a broadly recognized market fact.9
 In textile and transportation sectors, Korea and Japan’s exporters show different
behavioral patterns. In case of Korea, there is either little overshooting (textiles), or its
undoing is too slow to be relevant (transportation). These are sectors where Korea’s main
products have so far achieved limited degree of differentiation. Japan, too, shows no
perceptible overshooting in textiles, but its tendency to PTM looks smaller than Korea
both in the short and the long run (Figure 7). This result would be in line with Japan
focusing more on high-tech products (e.g., industrial fibers).10  In transportation, Japanese
exporters show substantially larger overshooting than the Korea counterparts, which too
is consistent with their product mix stressing luxury cars more.11
9 In marketing, the strategy of product differentiation has always existed (e.g., designer brand apparels such as 
Channel or Dior). However, Apple’s success in i-brand (i-pods, i-phones, i-pads) has been an important turning 
point in spreading such strategy to mass electronic products. Apple founder Steve Jobs’ strategy focused on 
creating halo effects, which prompt people to pay premiums for the i-brands. Samsung has also managed to 
create similar premiums (e.g. Galaxy-brands) during the last decade. However, halos that had existed in 
products like TVs for Japanese electronics companies have faded.  
10 While Korean textile companies still focus on intermediary inputs for garments, Japanese companies’ 
business portfolio has, since 1970s and 80s, shifted to inputs for general industrial production. For example, 
Teijin company is a globally dominant supplier of Aramid fiber (along with Dupont), which is sturdier than 
steel and resistant to heat and chemical. Toray Industries has been the global leader of carbon fiber composite, 
which can replace metal as the exterior material for aircrafts. 
11 This result is somewhat different from those of Hong and Ree (2015), which showed little overshooting 
dynamics. This is likely explained by their using a sample period starting 1980, which  produces a higher 
estimated long-run response of the relative profit margins to exchange rate changes. This paper uses data from 
1989 to 2013 for the Japan regression. The lower long term elasticity estimated by this paper seems to be 
consistent with the fact that Japanese car companies started their differentiation strategy only in 1989—the year 
Toyota first launched Lexus. 
13 
Figure 7. Profit Margin Adjustment in Response to a 10 Percent REER Depreciation 1/ 
1/ The magnitudes of initial adjustments correspond to the largest response of profit margin to a 10 percent exchange rate depreciation 
within the first 4 quarters. The profit margin adjustments within the first 20 quarters (5 years) are represented in the diamonds. 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Figure 8. Responses to a 10 percent depreciation: Japan vs. Korea 
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Box 2. Margin-Price Response to an Exchange Rate Shock (A Numerical Example) 
In this box, we construct a numerical example to demonstrate how exporters respond to exchange 
rate shocks—though profit margin adjustment, export prices, or both. The example is based on 
actual data disclosed by Samsung Electronics, in the company’s extranet posting. 
Exporter Response to a 5 percent Decrease of the Won-Dollar Exchange Rate:  
An Illustration 
 Initial price and markup. The factory shipping price of Samsung Galaxy Note 4 32 GB
memory (the company's flagship smart phone) to Korea’s top 3 domestic mobile service
carriers was 870,000 Won (excluding VAT) as of October 13, 2014. The corresponding
shipping price to the U.S. carrier AT&T, on the same day, was 825.99 dollars (also excluding
VAT), which amounts to 875,549 Won (1USD=1060KRW).  Lacking information on
marginal costs, we cannot uncover the markup from this data. However, we can compute
relative export markup of the Galaxy Note 4’s based on Martson’s methodology (see
Appendix 9). This markup is defined as ‘log(export price) minus log(domestic price)’ and
was 0.6 percent on the same day.
 Exchange rate shock and exporter reaction. Now let’s assume a 5 percent appreciation of
the Won’s exchange rate against dollar, which brings it to 1,007 Won/dollar. How would the
exporter respond?
15 
 No change in invoice price: One possibility is the exporter doing nothing. In fact, this is not
unrealistic as exporters generally cannot adjust invoice price in the short run due to contractual
obligations. In this case, the entire 5 percent shock is absorbed by the relative profit margin
which shrinks by 5 percent (we also assume no change in domestic invoice price). However,
the hit on the absolute profit margin on exports will be offset to the extent that the exchange
rate shock is passed through to the imported contents cost. For illustration, suppose that
imported contents took up 40 percent of the marginal cost (of Galaxy Note 4), and marginal
cost were 80 percent of the price (the same for both exported and domestically supplied ones).
If all of the imported contents were invoiced in dollars and fixed in the short run, then the
absolute export margin will shrink by only 2 percentage points, with the import price effect
providing a 3 percentage points offset (we assume no change in import price invoice price).
 No change in the relative mark up: The exporter can increase export prices and hold profit
margins on exports steady. Our analysis in this paper shows that exporters would generally
move in that direction over time, although they are not likely to go as far as fully passing
through exchange rate gains or losses to export prices. Suppose that the export prices of
Samsung Galaxy S4 increases by 5 percent to 870 dollars. The relative profit margin would
(by design) remain unchanged at 0.6 percent. With the same assumptions on the import price
effects as in the previous case, the absolute margin would increase by 2 percentage points
(relative margin will remain unchanged if we assume no change in domestic shipping price
despite a fall in imported cost).
 Middle solution: In reality, exporters would likely to choose somewhere in between the two
extreme responses described above.
Exporter Responses to a 5 Percent Decrease of Won-dollar Exchange Rate:  
An Illustration (continued)
16 
These findings, put together, suggest that if the weak Yen persists, it would strengthen Japan’s 
price competitiveness over time as export prices respond with a lag. It will also affect Korea’s 
REER (in proportion to Japan’s trade weight in Korea’s REER basket) and—through that—lead 
to similar, albeit smaller, response of Korea’s export prices. The overall responses of export 
prices of the two countries will determine relative price advantage of the two countries’ exports 
in the markets in third countries, particularly where exporters of the two countries aggressively 
compete.  
B.   What Could Happen to Future Export Volumes? 
An exchange rate shock, over time, shifts export prices to new equilibrium levels through 
price pass-through relationship. The move eventually pushes export volumes, also, to their 
new equilibrium values through demand curve relationship. Having estimated the price pass-
through relationship, or equivalently the degree of PTM, we gauge how export volumes react 
to changes in export prices. Our estimation suggests that Japan’s export volumes are unlikely 
to garner large gains from the weak Yen in the short run, but competitiveness gains can build 
up over time. It also indicates that a persistently weaker Yen could leave a lasting impacts on 
the Japanese exporters’ profits.12 
Figure 9. Short-Run and Long-Run Response of Export Volume  to a 10 percent REER Depreciation 
Export Elasticity  
Using the DOLS model similar to what was used in the previous subsection for the profit 
margin analysis we estimated both the long-run and short-run elasticity of export volumes to 
REER (see Appendices 1 and 5).13 Main findings are twofold (Figure 9): (i) short-run 
elasticity is low for both Korea and Japan; and (ii) elasticity tends to increase in the longer 
run.  
12 Our analysis in the subsection focuses mainly on Japan, given that Korea’s worries are mainly on competitive 
gains from the weak Yen that Japanese exporters may be poised to harness (i.e., Japan’s export elasticity). 
13  DOLS specification for estimating long-run elasticity regresses export volumes (EX_VOL_i) on trading 
partner outputs (Y_STAR_i) and REER (REER_i ) with i being Korea (KOR) and Japan (JP). OLS 
specification for estimating short run elasticity regresses export volumes (differenced) on trading partner 
outputs (differenced) and REER (differenced and lagged). For short term elasticity, we use both ECM and a 
simple ordinary least squares model (see Appendices 3–4 and 6–7). 
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Out-of-sample Analysis 
We then carried out an out-of-sample forecast of Japan’s export volumes based on DOLS 
models using two different control variables: one using REER (Appendix 1) and anther using 
the export prices (Appendix 2).14 In a nutshell, the exercise compares the actual export 
volumes since 2012 with their path predicted from the historical regression relationship 
before 2012. There are three main findings.  
 First, there are large persistent gaps between the actual export volumes and those that
would be predicted by our model (A+B in Figure 10).15
 Second, a quarter of the total gap may be attributed to slow or low response of price
to exchange rate shocks (B in figure 10). The out-of-sample forecast from our relative
margin regressions suggests that the traditional relationship between export price and
REER did not change (see Figure 11). A cautious case then can be made that B likely
is set to close if the Yen’s recent depreciation persists.
 Third, it is difficult to make any meaningful prediction on what is going to happen to
the portion of the total gap that reflects slow or low response of export volumes to
export price changes (A in figure 10). The recent sharp pick up in export volumes
point to a possibility that A may have at last begun to close. However it is equally
possible that this be transitory and that this portion of the gap instead reflects
structural changes. 16
14 The alternative DOLS model for estimating long-run elasticity regresses export volumes (EX_VOL_JPN) on 
export prices (EP_JPN) and trading partner outputs (Y_STAR_JPN).  
15 Figure 10 shows the out-of-sample forecasts from the two DOLs models explained above. Note the following: 
(i) A+B is the gap between the actual export volume and the level it needs to go back to restore its long run 
relationship with the current levels of exchange rates; (ii) A is the gap between the actual export volume and the 
level it needs to go back to restore its long run relationship with the current levels of export prices; (iii) The 
residual B represents the portion of the total gap A+B that owes to a delayed or weaker (than predicted by 
history) responses of prices to exchange rate shocks. Note that the current levels of export prices may not yet 
have attained the long-run equilibrium level relative to the exchange rates. 
16 One possible explanation can be a break in conventional export to trading partner output relationship. This 
can result from the increase in value-chain related activities or off-shoring productions, among many other 
factors. (See IMF (April 2015a)). Another possibility is simply that Japan’s quality excellence has ebbed, and 
an estimation of the price-volume relationship should take that into account. An interesting future avenue would 
be to include export quality variables (see Henn and others (2013) for a readily available database) in the 
regression. 
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Figure 10. Japan: Out-of-sample Forecasts for Export Volume 
(estimation based on 1989q1-2011q4) 
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Figure 11. Japan: Out-of-sample Forecasts for Export Prices 
(estimation based on 1989q1-2011q4)  
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Figure 12. Japan: Simulated Relative Export Margin 
 (Estimation based on 1989q1-2011q4) 
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Scenario Analysis 
To see what trajectory Japan’s export volumes and prices would take in case that A is indeed 
closing, we did a simulation analysis using both the relative mark up regressions (table 3) and 
the export volume regressions (Appendix 2):  
 If Japan’s export volumes fully come back to their equilibrium level (relative to the
export prices), it is going to increase by about 30–33 percent until end-2020 (left mid
chart, Figure 13). 17
 Exchange rate scenarios affect the path of export volumes to a limited extent. For
example, the export volume at the end of the simulation horizon would be 3-4 percent
less (left mid chart, Figure 13) when assuming a full unwinding of the Yen’s depreciation
since the third quarter of 2011 relative to the baseline scenario that assumes a zero
unwinding (right mid chart, Figure 13).18
 A permanent exchange rate shock could cause a permanent shift in profits. As an
illustration, the relative profit margins of Japanese firms would be 20 percent
(permanently) lower than in the baseline scenario if the Yen’s depreciation since August
2011 fully unwinds (Figure 12).
17 During this time horizon, Japan’s trading partner GDP is assumed to increase by 38 percent in line with 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook. 
18 The result reflects the dominant role of trading partner output (estimated by our regression models) in 
determining Japan’s export volumes. 
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Figure 13. Japan: Export Volume and Price Simulation 1/ 
60
80
100
120
140
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Actual
EP_JP_USD (Alternative)
EP_JP_USD (Baseline)
Export Price (USD)
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Actual
EPALL (Alternative)
EPALL (Baseline)
Export Price (JPN)
3.6
4.0
4.4
4.8
5.2
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Actual
EX_VOL_JPN (Alternative)
EX_VOL_JPN (Baseline)
Export Volume
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5.0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Actual
REER_JPN (Alternative)
Baseline
REER
3.6
4.0
4.4
4.8
5.2
5.6
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Actual Alternative Baseline
Y* (Japan's Trading Partner Avg.)
1/ Both the relative mark up regression (Table 3) and export volume regression (Appendix 2) has been used to generate 
simulated paths of five endogenous variables.  
2/ Baseline assumes that the current level of REER (as well as Yen-dollar exchange rate) is locked in, while the 
alternative scenario assumes that the depreciation of Yen since 2011q3 is fully unwound  over 8 quarters beginning 
from the first quarter of 2015.  
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IV. WHAT TO EXPECT FROM IMPORTED CONTENTS?
The effects of exchange rate appreciation on profit margins and price competitiveness of 
exporters can be partially offset by these effects also making imported contents cheaper.  
In this section, we examine how 
significant the offsetting effects of the 
Won’s appreciation of this sort would be 
in the context of the Yen’s depreciation 
against the Won.19 Traditionally, Korean 
manufacturers have had substantial 
upstream supply chain links to the 
Japanese companies. For example, 
Korean electronics companies continue 
to rely on Japanese precision equipment 
for producing semiconductors and Liquid 
Crystal Displays. 
However, OECD’s latest value-added-based trade statistics suggest that Japan is no longer 
the predominant player in Korea’s upstream supply chain (See Figure 14). 20 For example, in 
electronics, China has, by a good margin, surpassed Japan in that role. In chemicals, 
Australia is taking the lead, and the United States in logistics. How important are Japan 
contents in overall costs of Korea’s exports, and how much offset would that generate?:  
 (i)  Korea’s interconnectedness through value 
chain is on the high side, with foreign value 
added (FVA) accounting for 40 percent of 
Korea’s gross export value (Figure 15). This 
makes Korea fifth among the OECD countries 
on that aspect.  
(ii)  The FVA sourced from Japan amounts to 
5.1 percent of Korea’s overall exports. This is 
only moderately larger than FVA sourced 
from China (4.8 percent) and the United 
States (4.6 percent). Hence, the cost savings 
caused by the weak Yen through imported 
inputs from Japan would be modest.21  
 (iii) The Yen’s depreciation will result in larger trickle down effects though the imported 
cost channel to Korea than Korea’s non-Japan competitors (see Table 3).  
19 This section draws heavily on Ree and Choi (2014). 
20 The data allows one to disentangle gross export value, first into domestic and foreign value added, and then, 
within the foreign value added, value components generated from some 40 source countries. 
21 Moreover, most of the gains from the Yen’s depreciation would, in fact, be soaked up by the Japanese 
exporters, given that domestic value-added contents account for 85 percent of Japan’s exports. 
Figure 14. Korea’s FVA by Source Country and
Sector (In percent of gross exports, 2009) 
Figure 15. Korea’s Foreign Value-Added (FVA) 
Exports (In percent of gross exports, 2009)
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In all, Korea’s relatively large FVA to gross export ratio means that the negative competitive 
effects of a Won appreciation will be significantly offset through the imported cost channel. 
However, this would do little to arrest the negative competitive effects from the Yen’s 
depreciation. 
Table 3. Comparison of Japan Contents: Korea’s Top Export Sectors 
(In percent, share of FVA to gross exports) 
V.   CONCLUSION
Our study suggests that a persistently large depreciation of the Yen would strengthen Japan’s 
price competitiveness, through delayed responses of export prices. The extent and the timing 
of price pass-through seem to be related to the degree of product differentiation. The study 
also indicates that the direct boost from the weak Yen on Japan’s export may likely be 
restricted, given relatively small contribution of price variables in driving the export demand. 
Price pass-through effects can also be partially mitigated by offsets from the costs of 
imported inputs.  
We also find that a persistently weak Yen could lastingly boost the profits of Japan’s 
exporters, and correspondingly, if this coincides with a strong Won, Korean companies could 
suffer enduringly lower profits. The profit prospects faced by the Korean and Japanese 
companies would likely affect non-price decisions like where to invest new capacity and how 
much to invest in R&D, which would eventually drive underlying competitiveness of the two 
countries, going beyond the narrow bounds of simple price competition.  
This suggest that the limited export volume response to the Yen depreciation against the Won 
could mask what could result in a fundamental shift in competitiveness, if this were to persist, 
in two ways. First, our results show that Japanese and Korean exchange rate elasticities are 
low in the short run but they build up over time, albeit with a fairly long lag—so we would 
expect the price pass through and volume responses to grow as time passes. Second, 
persistent profit margin changes could lead to more fundamental and difficult to forecast 
non-price investment decisions which would take a long time to reveal themselves. For 
example, their result could be more outsourcing by Korean firms or better product 
development by Japanese firms, which would affect the value-added produced domestically 
of the countries’ exports, with corresponding implications for future productivity and output 
growth.
Korea Japan China Indonesia U.S. Germany France
Overall 5.1 85.2 4.4 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.8
Electrical 6.8 82.2 6.3 4.1 1.6 1.7 1.1
Transport 6.8 85.9 6.9 3.0 2.5 1.2 0.2
Chemical 4.1 78.9 4.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.9
Logistics 2.4 93.2 1.5 1.5 0.3 0.6 2.0
Metal 6.1 80.5 3.5 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.8
Sources: OECD; and IMF staff estimates.
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
REER_JPN -0.561458 0.089975 -6.240179 0
Y_STAR_JPN 0.699512 0.029046 24.08267 0
C 3.725076 0.537375 6.93199 0
R-squared 0.996267 4.197701
Adjusted R-squared 0.991158 0.2801
S.E. of regression 0.026338 0.02636
Durbin-Watson stat 1.210845 0.001214
 Mean dependent var
    S.D. dependent var
    Sum squared resid
    Long-run variance
Included observations: 91 after adjustments
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C
Automatic leads and lags specification (lead=12 and lag=12 based on AIC  criterion, max=12)
Long-run variance estimate (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth =  4.0000)      
Appendix 1 Japan Export Volume regression (DOLS): REER
Dependent Variable: EX_VOL_JPN
Method: Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS)
Date: 03/13/15   Time: 11:45
Sample (adjusted): 1989Q1 2011Q3
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
LOG(EP_JP_USD) -0.299789 0.141564 -2.11769 0.0387
Y_STAR_JPN 0.753667 0.033646 22.39969 0
C 2.314748 0.763023 3.033654 0.0037
R-squared 0.984491 4.202184
Adjusted R-squared 0.974339 0.281856
S.E. of regression 0.045151 0.112123
Durbin-Watson stat 0.679844 0.005027
    Mean dependent var
    S.D. dependent var
    Sum squared resid
    Long-run variance
Included observations: 92
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C
Automatic leads and lags specification (lead=11 and lag=5 based on AIC criterion, max=11)
        
Long-run variance estimate (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth =4.0000)
        
Appendix 2 Japan Export Volume regression (DOLS): Export Price
Dependent Variable: EX_VOL_JPN
Method: Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS)
Date: 03/13/15   Time: 11:40
Sample: 1989Q1 2011Q4
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Dependent Variable: D(EX_VOL_JPN)
Sample: 1989Q1 2014Q3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
D(REER_JPN) -0.11 0.08 -1.32
D(Y_STAR_JPN) 3.64 0.70 5.21
D(Y_STAR_JPN(-1)) 1.89 0.83 2.29
UHAT_JPN 0.06 0.09 0.63
C -0.06 0.01 -6.48
R-squared 0.4
Adjusted R-squared 0.4
Sample: 2000Q1 2014Q3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
D(REER_JPN) -0.05 0.14 -0.36
D(Y_STAR_JPN) 5.41 1.06 5.09
D(Y_STAR_JPN(-1)) 2.18 1.16 1.88
UHAT_JPN 0.08 0.11 0.74
C -0.09 0.01 -7.09
R-squared 0.62
Adjusted R-squared 0.59
Appendix 3: Japan Export Volume Regression (Error-Correction Model) with REER
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Dependent Variable: D(EX_VOL_JPN)
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1989Q1 2014Q3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
D(REER_JPN) -0.09 0.07 -1.16
D(Y_STAR_JPN) 3.61 0.69 5.20
D(Y_STAR_JPN(-1)) 2.17 0.69 3.14
C -0.06 0.01 -6.96
R-squared 0.44
Adjusted R-squared 0.43
Sample: 2000Q1 2014Q3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
D(REER_JPN) -0.01 0.13 -0.10
D(Y_STAR_JPN) 5.32 1.05 5.06
D(Y_STAR_JPN(-1)) 2.67 0.94 2.83
C -0.08 0.01 -7.47
R-squared 0.62
Adjusted R-squared 0.60
Appendix 4: Japan Export Volume Regression (OLS) with REER
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
REER_KOR -0.441861 0.335386 -1.317472 0.1913
Y_STAR_KOR 2.34795 0.067425 34.82304 0
C -4.782286 1.713532 -2.790893 0.0065
R-squared 0.991706 3.473862
Adjusted R-squared 0.989683 0.915913
S.E. of regression 0.093033 0.709716
Durbin-Watson stat 0.151126 0.037187
    S.D. dependent var
    Sum squared resid
    Long-run variance
Included observations: 103 after adjustments
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C
Fixed leads and lags specification (lead=4, lag=4)
Long-run variance estimate (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 5.0000)
    Mean dependent var
Appendix 5 Korea Export Volume regression (DOLS)
Dependent Variable: EX_VOL_KOR
Method: Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS)
Date: 04/16/15   Time: 18:24
Sample (adjusted): 1988Q1 2013Q3
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Dependent Variable: D(EX_VOL_KOR)
Sample: 1989Q1 2014Q3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
D(REER_KOR) -0.13 0.07 -1.71
D(Y_STAR_KOR) 2.76 0.74 3.71
D(Y_STAR_KOR(-1)) 0.25 0.69 0.37
UHAT_KOR 0.01 0.02 0.71
C -0.01 0.01 -1.29
R-squared 0.19
Adjusted R-squared 0.16
Sample: 2000Q1 2014Q3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
D(REER_KOR) 0.14 0.11 1.26
D(Y_STAR_KOR) 2.95 0.90 3.29
D(Y_STAR_KOR(-1)) 0.40 0.79 0.51
UHAT_KOR -0.01 0.06 -0.11
C -0.02 0.01 -1.66
R-squared 0.49
Adjusted R-squared 0.45
Appendix 6: Korea Export Volume Regression (Error-Correction Model) with REER
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Dependent Variable: D(EX_VOL_KOR)
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1989Q1 2014Q3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
D(REER_KOR) -0.13 0.07 -1.88
D(Y_STAR_KOR) 2.92 0.62 4.73
C -0.01 0.01 -1.14
R-squared 0.18
Adjusted R-squared 0.17
Sample: 2000Q1 2014Q3
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
D(REER_KOR) 0.12 0.10 1.18
D(Y_STAR_KOR) 3.22 0.64 5.07
C -0.01 0.01 -1.81
R-squared 0.48
Adjusted R-squared 0.47
Appendix 7: Korea Export Volume Regression (OLS) with REER
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Jan-2000 to Oct-2014
KRWJPY JPYUSD KRWUSD
KRWJPY 1.000
JPYUSD -0.828 1.000
KRWUSD 0.551 -0.013 1.000
Jan-2000 to Feb-2006
KRWJPY JPYUSD KRWUSD
KRWJPY 1.000
JPYUSD -0.127 1.000
KRWUSD 0.599 0.706 1.000
Mar-2006 to Mar-2015
KRWJPY JPYUSD KRWUSD
KRWJPY 1.000
JPYUSD -0.928 1.000
KRWUSD 0.814 -0.556 1.000
1/ Monthly average exchange rates.
Appendix 8. What’s Driving the Won/Yen Cross Rate?  
 
Since September 2011, Yen has depreciated against the won by near 70 percent. With no 
direct market for Won-to-Yen trading, the Won exchange rate against Yen is determined by 
the cross rate between Won-dollar (KRWUSD) and Yen-dollar (JPYUSD) exchange rates. If 
the cross rate shows particularly strong association with one of the two currencies, then it can 
be seen as being driven by factors specific to that currency (e.g., Korea’s current account 
surplus, safe-haven capital flow to Japan, Abenomics).1  
Using monthly exchange rates during January 2000 to March 2015, we investigated whether 
that was the case. We too examined the correlation between KRWUSD and JPYUSD.  
 
Correlation between the Won and the Yen 
Jan-2000 to Feb-2006:  The correlation between the 
cross rate and KRWUSD was 0.6. Strengthening of 
the Won against the US dollar thus seems to have 
caused its appreciation against the Yen. The Yen’s 
exchange rate move against dollar seems to have 
triggered a recoupling shift by the Won (e.g., weak 
Yen causes Won to weaken too against dollar), thus 
hardly moving the cross rate. This is indicated by the 
cross rate’s near zero correlation with JPYUSD, as 
well as a relatively high correlation of 0.7 between 
JPYUSD and KRWUSD. The recoupling shifts may 
have resulted from both Korean authorities’ FX 
intervention behavior and sensitivity of Korea’s 
current account to the Yen-dollar exchange rates 
during this period. During Dec-2003 to June 2007, 
the Won has appreciated against Yen by 33 percent, 
with the KRWUSD accounting for about 60 percent of the appreciation.   
Mar-2006 to Mar-2015:  The correlation between the cross rate and JPYUSD jumped to -0.9, 
indicating that factors specific to the Yen (e.g., monetary easing since late 2011) may have 
been driving the Won/Yen cross exchange rate. At the same time, the Won tended to move in 
the opposite direction to Yen. For example, while the Won tumbled during the global 
financial crisis, the Yen saw a sustained boost owing to both safe-haven flows, and the 
retrenchment of overseas investments. The Yen’s sharp depreciation since late 2011 was 
accompanied by the Won’s moderate appreciation against dollar due to current account 
surplus and repricing of Korea risks. During Nov-2011 to [Feb]-2015, the Won has 
appreciated against Yen by 40 percent, with the JPYUSD accounting for 97 percent of the 
appreciation.  
                                                                 
1 The cross rate may also be affected by factors common to dollar as the Won and Yen may have different betas. 
For example, consider the following simple model: Log (Ej) =Log(aj )+ bj * Log (E) + Log(Uj), where Ej is 
dollar’s exchange rate against country j, E U.S. dollar index or dollar’s NEER, a and b constants, and Uj a 
random variable representing stochastic shocks specific to currency j. Then Log (E1/E2)=Log(a1/a2)+(b1-
b2)*Log(E)+Log(U1/U2). If b1 and b2 are both positive and relatively close, the cross rate will be mainly 
driven by U1/U2. However, if b1 and b2 are of different signs (which is possible in view of Yen’s safe haven 
behavior after the crisis), the cross rate can also be heavily driven by E. 
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Appendix 9. Estimation of PTM—Technical Note 
To gauge how exporters respond to exchange rate shocks through profit margin adjustments, 
we use a model developed by Marston (1990). Assume a manufacturer that produces all 
goods locally and sells them in both domestic and export markets applying differentiated 
prices. In this setting, relative profit margins are simply the difference between export and 
domestic prices, which we call ‘relative profit margins’, as marginal costs (the unobservable) 
are assumed to be the same.  
Using data on four key export sectors (transportation, electronics, metals and textiles) that 
account for about 40 percent of the Japanese and Korean exports, we as the first step employ 
a dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS, hereafter) model, developed by Stock and Watson 
(1993), for the relative profit margin.2 By its nature (i.e., cointegrating relationship) the 
DOLS model allows us to tease out the long run elasticity of relative margins to REER. Then 
to obtain the short-run elasticity and also to gauge the speed with which the dependent 
variable goes back to the long-run equilibrium (i.e., value predicted by cointegrating relation 
estimated by the DOLS at the first step), we estimate an error correction model (ECM) as the 
second step.3  
The dynamic ordinary least squares regression specification is as follows: 
P୶,୧୲ െ P୦,୧୲Px, it െ P୦,୧୲ ൌ β଴ ൅ βଵሺs୲ሻ ൅ βଶሺc୲ሻ ൅ βଷy୲ ൅ βସy୲∗ ൅ u୲  (1) 
where P୶,୧୲ is the export prices described in the domestic currency for sector i (i.e. sectoral 
Yen-based export prices in the case of Japan and sectoral Won-based export prices in the 
case of Korea), P୦,୧୲ is the price of goods sold in the domestic market for sector i (PPI series 
available at sectoral level), s୲ is the real effective exchange rate,	c୲ is real production costs 
(proxied by the input price index of imported inputs), y୲ is income represented by the 
2 There are several conditions to be satisfied when conducting a DOLS regression: (1) non-stationarity of the 
level data, while the first differences of the variables should be stationary and (2) residuals from DOLS 
regressions should be stationary. The data used satisfy the (1) requirement (which we omit to report) and the 
ADF test statistics are reported in Tables 3 and 4.  
3 The two step method used by this paper is a well established approach in the literature, first proposed by Engle 
and Granger (1987). With the first step estimator proven super-consistence (i.e., converging to the true 
coefficient value at a rate T-1, where T is the sample size; Stock 1987), the second step estimator has been 
shown to be statistically consistent. However, Banerjee et al (1993) illustrated that Engle and Granger’s simple 
(OLS) estimator can suffer significant small sample bias. In response, Stock and Watson (1993) and Saikkonen 
(1991) proposed simple method to correct this problem, called DOLS (dynamic ordinary least squares). We 
adopt Stock and Watson’s version of DOLS in this paper. An alternative is use of multiviariate cointegration 
models. The advantage of the alternative is that it is flexible in terms of the number of cointegrating 
relationships (in contrast, the two step approach assumes at most one cointegrating relationship and hence is 
more restrictive). However, it is well known that the second approach is subject to serious size and power 
distortions (Donaldo et al 1999, Ogaki 1993).  In this paper, we choose the standard two step approach 
considering all the above. Our pre-tests point to at most one co-integrating relationship, strengthening the case 
for this choice. The theoretical model (Marston 1990) adopted here also supports it (i.e., the use of a single 
equation cointegration model). 
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manufacturing industrial production, y୲∗ is the partner country’s income represented by the 
partner country demand series (from IMF’s GAS-GEE database). It is important to note that 
the only sign implied by the model is that of the coefficient on the real exchange rate, βଵ, 
which is negative. The DOLS model includes both leads and lags of the first difference of all 
explanatory variables, the notation for which is suppressed in (1) for the sake of simplicity.4 
   
Relative Profit Margin 1/ and Yen REER since 2009 
We first examine trends of the relative profit 
margins. The figure in the left reveals a close 
co-movement between the relative profit 
margins of the Japanese companies and the 
Yen’s real effective exchange rate, suggesting 
Japanese companies’ PTM behaviors. It also 
shows that the relative margins of Korea and 
Japan have visibly diverged in an opposite 
direction in recent years. This may be either 
because Korean companies have maintained 
invoice price despite the Won’s appreciation, 
or have been forced to cut invoice price as the destination market prices have gradually 
reflected the Yen’s depreciation. In either case, the divergence is indicative of PTM 
behaviors by the Korean exporters.5 
 
Long-run Equilibrium 
 
The model explains the behavior of the relative profit margins well , as indicated by adjusted-
Rଶ being mostly above 0.95 (Table A.1). The ADF statistics reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root in residuals at 1% in most industries.  
 
The estimation results show that a 10 percent depreciation of the Yen in real terms, all else 
equal, increases the Yen-denominated export prices by 3-5 percent relative to the price 
Japanese manufacturers charge domestically6. Japanese manufacturers, electronics respond 
through profit margin adjustment the most, while metal the least.  On the other hand, Korea 
manufacturers generally show higher long-run equilibrium elasticity, ranging from 5–
7 percent, except for electronics. In other words, the Korean exporters, except for electronics, 
tend to adjust more through profit margin adjustment in the long-run.  
                                                                 
4 Some readers may wonder why we are analyzing a conceptual construct like relative margins based on macro 
data when more direct profit data are available at micro levels. In fact, a few previous studies have examined  
PTM behaviors using micro firm level data (e.g., Burstein and Jaimovich (2012), Fitzgerald and  Haller 
(2013)).In this paper, however, our main interest is to compare short-term and long-term responses of exporters 
for which micro data does not work given their limited length in time. Firm level profit data also can be 
misleading for global companies where profits are consolidated globally.  
5 See Box 2 for an illustration of exporters’ pricing decisions (including those of a pure PTM) in the face of 
exchange rate movements. 
6 The relative profit margin is equivalent to the margin between export price and domestic price, and we use 
both interpretations interchangeably.  
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Transportation Textile Metal Electronics
Real Exchange Rate -0.36 -0.43 -0.33 -0.49
(0.04) (0.15) (0.27) (0.08)
Imported Input Price -0.44 -0.31 1.68 -0.92
(0.06) (0.09) (0.16) (0.12)
Partner Country Demand 0.00 -0.20 1.48 -0.16
(0.02) (0.48) (0.85) (0.03)
Industrial Production 0.08 1.02 -0.85 1.63
(0.09) (0.32) (0.56) (0.17)
Adjusted R-Square 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.90
Error-Correction Coefficient -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 -0.03
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -4.12 -7.47 -3.05 -3.23
Table A.1. Japan: Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares Estimation Results 
Footnote: The rows below the coefficients report standard errors. Critical values for augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test with constant and linear trend with maximum lags 12 are -3.50, -2.89, -2.58 at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively.  
36 
Transportation Textile Metal Electronics
Real Exchange Rate -0.56 -0.72 -0.51 -0.13
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.14)
Imported Input Price -0.61 0.08 -0.32 0.35
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.21)
Export Volume 0.28 -1.21 -0.49 -0.53
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12)
Industrial Production 0.91 1.86 1.34 0.30
(0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.28)
Adjusted R-Square 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98
Error-Correction Coefficient -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -7.45 -6.44 -4.62 -5.86
Table A.2. Korea: Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares Estimation Results 
Footnote: The rows below the coefficients report standard errors. Critical values for augmented Dickey-
Fuller test with constant with maximum lags 13 are -3.50, -2.89, -2.58 at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
How quickly do relative export prices return to the estimated long-run relationship after an 
exchange rate shock? Tables A.1 and A.2 present the estimates of the error-correction terms. 
A statistically significant negative coefficient indicates the relative export prices revert to a 
conditional mean defined by the cointegrating vector. The estimated ECM terms come with 
the correct sign and most are significant. The speed of adjustment toward the long-run 
equilibrium is higher for Japan than that of Korea, where almost all the adjustments to the 
long-run equilibrium are made within 20 quarters. 
Finally, to see if the PTM behaviors have been different from previous episodes, we 
conducted an out-of-sample forecast based on the model estimated using observations 
through the third quarter of 2011 (when the Japanese REER began to depreciate steeply). We 
compared the forecasted relative profit margins and the actual ones since the fourth quarter of 
2011.  
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Out-of-Sample Forecast of Profit Margin Adjustment to a REER Shock 
(Forecast horizon: 2012Q1 to 2014Q4)7 
 
As shown in figure above, the comparison shows mixed results. For transportation and textile, 
recent pricing-to-market behaviors exhibited by the Japanese exporters are not different from 
what’s predicted by the long-run relationship that existed before the Abenomics period. 
However, in electronics, exporters seem to be passing more exchange rate gains through to 
export prices than in the past. The past pricing behaviors also do not well predict the current 
behaviors of metal exporters. However, the gap is hard to interpret than in the case of 
electronics exporters. We omitted similar exercise for Korea given the limited REER shock 
to Won caused by Yen (which reflects Japan’s relatively small weight as Korea’s trading 
partner).  
                                                                 
7 Using the results from 1989Q1 to 2011Q4, out-of-sample forecasts are conducted using dynamic ordinary 
least squares (DOLS) for 2012Q1 to 2014Q4.  
